Autonomy
and Authority in Schools and Society
by
Greg Kagira-Watson
© copyright
1988
ABSTRACT
As the world becomes increasingly more democratic,
the locus of power and authority has been shifting to the people and at
the same time our understanding of authority is changing. The word authority comes from the same root
as the word author. To author is to create. This paper could
have been titled The Redistribution of
Authority to the People, because it discusses the concept of authority
in generalized principles—not only as they pertain to the case studies
reviewed here, but as they apply to humanity as a whole. Although the principles discussed here have
equal relevance for the world in general, this analysis does take place largely within the context of education—in my
review of two books that describe how young children tacitly come to some
understanding of the relationship between autonomy and authority within a
classroom or group setting, through an all too frequent insidious and invidious
socialization process. The books are
analyzed through the conceptual framework of Kenneth Benne’s
"anthropogogical"
authority as a proposed paradigm shift for our time (Benne,
1970). In a sense, one purpose of this
paper is to sum up the meaning of anthropogogical.
“To understand” always means the ability
to grasp the general in the particular, and to conversely apply principles to
specific instances of their application.
This translation, or the ability to move back and forth between the
specific and the general, represents the ability to abstract the principles and
consolidate them. Hence, the analysis of
the principles explicated in this paper moves back and forth between the
general and the specific as a means of consolidating understanding. The paper is written like a
hologram—that is, with the whole contained in each of its parts—so
that the reader does not get lost in the detailed aspects of the case studies
(the story).
The distribution of authority throughout human
systems of organization—from the grass-roots level of society to the
highest levels of national government—has come to rest upon codes of
ethics, and on the rule of law and
its principles. This starts in
childhood and continues into our adult life.
To be a citizen within a community is to respect and honor a particular
set of “universal” rights and duties, rules and laws. Hence, I posit the idea that citizenship can
be the source of inspiration—that higher
ethic beckoning the community to unity—which Benne calls for in his
paradigm. The authority resting upon
this ethic can be "the power that allows people in different ways of
life to turn to one and the same source of inspiration...[and
thus] be inspired to unanimity... [for it] secures the cooperation of people
who differ..." (Benne, 1970).
Further discussion (beyond the scope of this paper)
of the relationship between authority
and autonomy (A&A) within adult
organizations or institutions would undoubtedly uncover other dimensions of the
interplay between A&A that are not examined deeply here. For example, an analysis of decentralized and participatory decision-making structures—such as group
consultation—would be more developed in that discussion, though this
paper does touch upon it.
In Vivian Paley's book, Mollie is Three, a classic ethnographic
description of a child-care center at the University of Chicago lab school, we
can observe the socialization process of a preschooler who does not yet have
the social skills to adjust easily to the setting, but begins to understand
some of the limits of her autonomy through recognizing her
interdependence. The stages she goes
through are not unlike those seen in the immature relationships among nations,
so the story can serve as a metaphor for what happens to humans at adult levels
of social interaction. The story is not
merely a metaphor, however, and there is much to be learned about adults
directly within the narrative. For
example, Ms. Paley is a participant observer within the socialization process of her
students. Hence, her own understanding
of her own A&A is seen evolving synchronistically
with her students. Respecting the life
of children being who they are the age they are in their lives, not merely as
precursors to future adults, she struggles with her own role of positional authority,
as she becomes subject to the rules that children invent for themselves.
The ability of children to intuitively perceive the
roles, rituals and rules of group behavior—and even to invent them for
themselves—leads one to speculate whether something like a socialization organ is within us, not
unlike Chomsky’s notion of a language
organ. There may be something innate about social interaction that
automatically emerges when human beings are put together, merely because human
beings are always social beings. This
speculation gives rise to the conclusion that individual human development can
never be understood without a systems
view of this embeddedness. These two aspects of human
development—authority and autonomy—are examined from this systems perspective and help define our
inherent embeddedness and interrelationship with
others. Although some principles are
specific to particular domains, systems science argues that generalized
principles are independent from any one specific domain we might be
examining. Elegance comes from the
tremendous reach of a few simple principles.
Hence, as we examine autonomy and authority within the world of children
we must not get lost in the world of children—we must reach beyond it to
see ourselves.
Authority and autonomy are obvious areas in which we
humans have great difficulty and much to work on. Everyone resists dominance, yet everyone has
a tendency to dominate. This can be as subtle
as wanting to be right, by making others wrong or by discounting the opinions
of others. As adults, we would do well
to learn higher principles of consultation (all participants seeking truth,
justice and agreement) and be guided by them.
Indeed, Benne ultimately concludes that competence in the art of
dialogue is the key to gaining the balance between autonomy and authority.
Definitions:
1.
The bearers of
authority—those in authority positions—we shall refer to as bearers, rulers, or benefactors.
- "The ultimate bearer of …authority is
community life." (Benne, 1970)
2.
Those who are
subject to authority over them we shall refer to as subjects, dependents, or recipients—an amalgamation of
these three terms.
- The term subjects
is preferred to dependents, (or
at least a necessary addition to the concept of dependents) since dependents
can be thought of as objects. Objects
(Freire, 1970) are considered to have been
deprived of autonomy through a process of dehumanization and must thus be
excluded from any possibility of accidental inclusion in our
thinking. Subjects become objects
when they are on the receiving end of false
generosity—a coercive form of subordination (Freire,
1970).
Autonomy and Authority in Schools and Society
Table of Contents
A few
words about Freedom.. 3
What
we can learn about adults from three-year-olds. 4
Bad
news— what can happen when parents farm out their children. 4
Observing
authority and autonomy begin to develop. 4
From
the specific to the general—abstracting the prinicples. 5
From
“Constraint to Connection”—through recognition of
interdependence. 5
Two
kinds of freedom for individuals—one alone, the other in groups. 6
The
difficulty of seeing and accepting our interdependence. 7
Autonomy
increases with the transfer of authority. 7
Hierarchy
does not preclude the distribution of power within the wider community. 7
Abuse
of power disappears within a new culture
of learning. 8
Responsibilities
from the Bottom must be balanced with those from the Top. 8
Inherent
freedoms are derived from our loyalty to those we give power 9
When
the locus of power is not distributed its use can still be legitimate. 9
Self-renewing
systems. 10
Legitimate
power is laudable and praiseworthy. 10
Moving
from constraint to connection. 11
Subversion
of authority when subjects usurp power 11
A good
model of authority and autonomy in a preschool 12
ENDNOTES. 13
BIBLIOGRAPHY.. 18
Autonomy is classically thought to mean the
"ability" to act independently, without intervention or interference
from others—be they rulers or subjects.
For our purposes here we will define it as anyone’s freedom to act and to
exercise power—be they rulers or subjects. Common use of the term autonomy implies the
"freedom" of subjects to act outside (without) or out-from-under the
control of some other agency, entity or authority. Frankly, however, in a
world of interdependent relationships among people this is impossible. Likewise, those in authority who wield power
over their subjects often equate freedom with their own power—considering
it their “freedom” or right to exercise power without due
consideration of subjects. This too is a
distortion, and the reason behind resentment for institutional authority. The relationship between autonomy and
authority is inherent within social systems, and we must learn to think
differently about them because our understanding is mostly unconscious and
immature.
Just as the evolution of our thinking (the development of
our understanding) has brought us through paradigmatic shifts in our
world-views (Aristotelian/Ptolemaic, Copernican, Newtonian, Einsteinian,
Heisenbergian, Whiteheadian,
etc.), the time has come, as humankind approaches its
"coming-of-age"[1] (as a species and a society), to re-think the
terms "freedom," "independence,"
"interdependence," "autonomy," "authority,"
"responsibility," and the relationship of these concepts to each
other. This is just as true for
teachers and students in the classrooms as it is for nations in the world.
In the examples that follow, we see that the idea of
autonomy outside authority is about as meaningless to educators as the ideology
of unlimited and inviolable national sovereignty is senseless in a world of
interdependent nations and peoples—especially in a world where
dictatorial governments can become the worst enemy of their own people. Some higher authority must
needs be, while guarding against the pitfalls of excessive
centralization and bureaucracy. Both
autonomy and authority are best understood through a web of relationships, in
the context of interdependence.
True freedom does not exist apart from responsibility.[see endnote
#18] Excessive freedom is actually
license and lowers itself to the domain of the animal. Collectively, the present stage of
humanity’s development is quite parallel to the turbulent stage of
adolescence in individuals, and it is up to educational and political
leadership to help bring about the developments leading to greater
maturity. A better understanding about the relationship between authority
and autonomy should assist us educators in helping bring about such a change.
Autonomy and authority have traditionally been thought to be
at variance with one another, for autonomy is associated with freedom, while authority
has been associated with power and control in a way that limits the freedom of
those who are in some way dependent upon, or subject to, it. Freedom and
authority have been dichotomized. Just as the dichotomy is inaccurate,
the definition of freedom may change within a new understanding of autonomy,
one in which freedom is not the antithesis of authority's control, but exists
within the context of the authority relationship. It may be that freedom can only exist in
obedience to the codes of civilized conduct, not through exemption from them.
In Vivian Paley's book, Mollie
is Three, a classic ethnographic description of a child-care center at the
University of Chicago lab school, we may have the opportunity to observe
ontogeny (in individual beings) recapitulate the process humanity is going
through as it "comes of age." Each individual (being) goes
through an evolution in the understanding of his/her own autonomy by
recognizing his/her interdependence, and in the book we can see some of these
stages reflected. Ms. Paley portrays her own
understanding, and consequently her role, as evolving synchronistically
with her students.
Historically, one of the earliest concepts (really a
"distortion" [2] ) of authority is more
accurately called authoritarianism — favoring complete obedience to an
almost dictatorial authority. It may work well in the training of
animals, but not too well with human beings. This is represented in Paley's book by the development of the
"authoritarian" behavior of children — expressed in the
power-grabbing technique's of Frederick [3], and in Eric's control (and freedom
limiting) of John.[4] John has, in large measure, lost his autonomy
through Eric's abuse of power in the relationship. This is a
dominant/submissive relationship, sometimes encouraged merely by putting
children into social groups where children have to fend for themselves before
they (and their peers) have social skills (such as confidence, courtesy and
diplomacy) that enable them to interact healthily.
These social skills are of the type that can be more
healthily developed inside families, where children can be taught about these
values by adults and not their immature peers.
Paradoxically, families often put their children into these social
situations much too early, thinking that the preschool is the place where their
children can best develop social skills.
Ironically, this can be like throwing the seals to the sharks. The
unnecessary tragedy this sometimes poses for children is clearly demonstrated
through Mollie’s story in Mollie is Three—
where this one child experienced about a year of sustained harassment and
humiliation from the other children before she "learned" the
hierarchy and the rules within the learning environment (rules established by
the other children). Her innocent desire
(“Will you be my friend?”) to belong is in stark contrast to the
punishments and ostracisation the other children were
able to mete out to get her to conform (“We’re not going to play
with you unless…”) —and conform she did. Children are unkind until they learn not to
be. Mollie was put with children who had
not yet learned to be kind and loving—and became one of them.
Subsequent examples of the social patterns revealed in the
book Mollie is Three show this developmental evolution of the balance
between authority and autonomy, corresponding to an increasing understanding
among the children of what it means to live in a world of interdependent
beings:
(1)
Frederick,
in his subsequent confrontation with the "positional authority" [5]
of Ms. Paley
(2)
All of the children, as they develop roles
(positions of authority)
(3)
The children’s invention (or acceptance)
of an "authority of rules" [6] (which even Ms. Paley
submits to occasionally by entering the children's group fantasy [7] )
(4)
The culture of the classroom eventually
developing a kind of "anthropogogical"
authority which Benne (1970) [8] describes as
residing in a community of learners by means of agreement (either
tacit, or through consultation or dialogue). [9]
Benne’s attempt to
define anthropogogical authority emphasizes this
culture of learning (inside or outside of schools) and the goal of unity or
agreement:
"The ultimate bearer of
educational authority is community life..." "The function of
educational authority is to focus processes of joint learning upon the very issues which are involved in
conflicts... The method of learning from conflict must be broadly
dialogic...." (Benne, p. 406 and 401.) [emphasis mine]
With these references to specific cases—in order to
show the parallels in the evolution of concepts—we may have gotten ahead
of the very definition and understanding of these terms authority and autonomy.
So let us first abstract a few more principles from these major concepts,
explore them more generally, and then come back to the specific context of Paley [11] and Carew. [12]
From a macro perspective it is now possible to see that true
autonomy (i.e., our highest concept of autonomy) cannot exist outside the
context of dependence, or interdependence, and that such interdependence
implies the aegis or auspices of authority—for everyone lives within a
matrix of relationships. As Benne says:
"We are all born
excommunicated... [we all] develop through processes of interaccommodation
with various environmental energies ['significant others']... develop
inescapably into identification and affiliation with those human powers which
support and sustain [us] during the period of [our] extreme dependence.
And men and women never escape...from the web of interdependence thus woven
into the very structure of their minds and persons." [13]
This quote from Benne above is one about autonomy—a
redefinition that excludes independence
as an intellectual fiction. Autonomy exists
only within interdependence—what used to be termed relative
autonomy. However, interdependence does
not necessarily constrain us in a pejorative sense. This new definition requires us to re-think
our definition of authority as well, if we are to understand how they are
interwoven.
Benne’s new characterization
of authority (1970) asks us to consider ways in which the kind of "constraint"
of authority experienced by Mrs. Allen in Carew's
interview [14] moves toward "connection" (between bearers of
authority and those who depend upon it) in order to support the dependent's
autonomy. [15]
It seems to me that there are two kinds of freedom in action
(autonomy). One is defined within the
realm of personal choice and free-will, where the consequences of one’s
actions do not directly affect anyone significantly. The other can only result from a kind of
authorized joint-decision making process—not necessarily without the
conflict of ideas, but arriving at consensus (if not by unanimity, then by
vote) about what action should be taken within a relationship or a group.
This is still free-will, but a joint decision or group choice that can leave
participants with a sense of freedom inside their willingness to abide by the
decision they helped to make.
“Inside their willingness”—meaning that freedom is
preserved when compliance is voluntary rather than compulsory.
- To
alienate people from their own decision-making is to change them into objects. Any situation where some prevent others
from engaging in inquiry is a form of violence. (Freire, 1970)
By contrast, author Jean Carew
shows how Mrs. Allen's case illustrates the constraint of autonomy under the
insensitive authority of bureaucracy — a constraint which undermines the
bureaucracy’s own power because those subject to it will often subvert it
(i.e., Mrs. Allen intentionally spills the coffee on the test papers so she
doesn't have to submit them.[10] ). Had
consultation taken place as the rules and regulations were established within
this bureaucracy Mrs. Allen would have felt included. In a more mature consultation process she
would have already been in agreement with the decision of authority when it
came time to handing in those papers—perhaps having directly affected the
outcome of the consultation (the decision whether or not she would have to
submit papers). Granted, not all
bureaucracies can be this democratic, but the need for individual autonomy
cannot simply be ignored because of this.
Mutiny can result. Thus,
institutions should be just as interested in securing autonomy and freedom for
individuals, as are the individuals themselves.
In families, the line between the realm of personal choice
and the need for consultation about what behaviors might have consequences for
other members of the family is often obscured.
Marriage counselors have come to realize that this confusion creates
tension within marriages—when one partner does not realize how his or her
decisions impact the life of the other.
Our unconscious patterns of behavior—and what we take for
granted—all stem from our childhood, where we either begin to become of
aware of the importance of consideration for others or we do not.
Unfortunately, institutions and organizations reflect the
same immaturity found in individuals and marriages, and exhibit lack of
consideration for their members—the same lack of awareness of the
consequences that decisions have on others (members of the organization). Human beings have yet to learn that they have
no legitimate freedom to make decisions that take away another’s
freedom. I believe that Benne is
attempting to suggest that a more highly evolved expression of authority
recognizes this principle. Those in
positional-authority roles mature as they consider the rights and needs of
those impacted by their decisions.
Benne has accurately observed, I think, that "the
difficulties of modern men in giving clear meaning to authority stem from
larger difficulties in seeing and accepting interdependence as a necessary and
important part of human existence." [16] Once the human
condition is undeniably [17] understood to exist within a web of dependence and
interdependence, however, then this new definition is possible. Early
definitions or concepts of authority tend to more closely reflect the meaning
of authoritarianism,
and hence can now be seen as a distortion of the term — a distortion from
an unnecessary oversimplification. For example, Illich's
(1970) objection to authority is clearly a rejection of the abuse
of power and the notion that authority is coercive and controlling—again
confusing "authority" with "authoritarian" and imposing the
above mentioned dichotomy.
But freedom does not exist without responsibility (for both
rulers and subjects), [18] and thus the relationship between the locus [19] of
authority and its subjects (dependents) becomes more complex than the mere
obedience to rules [20] or demands, and the behavioral consequences of rewards
and punishments. [21] Authority, in this
context, is not invidious.
We see that authority is transferred with the transfer of
responsibility (else the recipient does not have the freedom to carry out that
responsibility), and that through the transfer greater autonomy is
gained. The relationship [22] in which both the bearers of authority and
subjects have responsibilities to each other is what makes the definition more
complex — but at the same time more understandable. (By analogy,
the modern conceptions of aerodynamics, though complex, reflect a much greater
understanding of flight than the first conceptions of flight.)
As societies become more democratic [23], centers of authority and power can
be seen to exist more for the purpose of providing, or administering
service(s). "Positional authority" [24] — the authority
derived from the bearer's role in society (or institution) or from the degree
of expertise [25] the bearer has in a field — remains as common as it was
under the most autocratic circumstances. But it is precisely because
recipients of the services require (inherently need) the "guidance or
direction from [a] source outside himself or itself" [26] that the more
modern [27] relationships exist. As Benne says,
"In each claim [to obedience, or power, or
authority] there is an implicit or explicit offer of service to the dependent
in fulfilling some more-or-less defined human need or function as well as an
explicit or implicit threat of power over him." [28]
Hierarchy does not preclude the distribution of power within
the wider community
Benne declares that these relationships can be highly
imperfect and limited if the authority in those relationships is not "the
power that allows people in different ways of life to turn to one and the
same source of inspiration...[and thus] be
inspired to unanimity...[for it] secures the cooperation of people who
differ..." [29], and
thus he posits the notion of the necessary emergence of "anthropogogical" authority — which essentially means that both sides
(bearer and recipient) in collaboration are dynamically able to construct and
reconstruct, define and re-define what the rules and relationships of authority
are. In spite of the fact that both "rule authority" and
"expert authority" will continue to operate [30], there will need to
be a "redistribution of power" [31] such that the locus of authority
(or "ultimate bearer" [32]) resides in the "common life of the
wider community" [33].
In this context, with respect to education, Benne believes
that teachers and learners have the potential become collegial [34] while they
collaborate "as equals" [35] and each learns from the other
[36]. Self-reeducation [37] of all ages [38] is a goal. Guided by
the teleology of unanimity, conflict over what is desirable [39] is not only
seen as unavoidable, but to be welcomed [40] as the dialectic [41] of synthesis
which continually "renews, revises and revolutionizes" [42] the
society and culture through dialogue [43] and consultation. Lightfoot
states, "Conflict is potentially constructive as a way of clarifying and
resolving differences in culture and ideology between families and schools. .
." [44] The spark of truth comes forth from the clash of varying
opinions. Conflict is converted to learning [45]. Indeed, today, in the field of conflict
resolution many negotiators regard conflict as not only inevitable (and
irresolvable) but in some ways desirable—as a way of managing
relationships. Conflicts are not resolved,
they are managed. (This stance
may be somewhat suspect and self-serving, however, since there is inherent job
security in taking this position; i.e., unresolved conflicts will always demand
the skills of the negotiator.) This view
begs the question whether conflicts can disappear simply as perceptions mature.
As part of the dialogic, one of the responsibilities of the
dependent (the recipient of these services provided by the authority) is to
scrutinize [47] the authority’s use of power in providing that service or
exercising that guidance [48]. If the dependent’s autonomy is
guaranteed, and his needs are met (in keeping with his expectations), then
there is synchrony and voluntary compliance.
Otherwise, subversion of authority is a likely path of struggle for him
to obtain his autonomy and needs.
“What’s fair” must be clearly understood
and agreed upon by both sides or there is always risk of subversion,
disobedience and apathy. Without the
explicit definition of the limits of power which Sennett
(see endnote #17) suggests, the act of subversion can consist in the
illegitimate use of power by subjects (dependents) as well as by institutions
(rulers, or those in authority).
The power inherent [49] within authority in democratic government, for
example, is theoretically derived from the consent of the governed, just as the
authority itself is so derived. Thus, both power and authority must not
always be seen at the "other end of the scale from 'democratic'"
[50]. In sum, those in authority would have no power over their
dependents without the primary responsibility to render service(s).
Service is a prima facie duty.
Those in power exist precisely because of those they need to serve (whether
this service is delivered or not).
Conversely, subjects have the duty of obedience to the
decisions of authority (justly derived) in order that some semblance of order
in society can be preserved. Civil disobedience is only legitimate when
subjects have no access to due process, for obedience is the only way to
determine whether a decision, a rule, or law is correct. Bad policies become evident over time, unless
anarchy obscures them. Through obedience it becomes obvious that bad
policies are bad because they fail to work. Otherwise (without
obedience), the inefficacy of some decision may be as easily attributed to the
anarchy and disobedience as to its incorrectness. Dependents do themselves a disservice when
they mask bad policies through disobedience.
The policies may never be changed if they are not determined to be the
source of the problem.
In democratic societies the meaning of autonomy within the
context of authority is clearly one of interdependence, for governors do not
exist without those who are to be governed and freedom cannot exist without
government to protect it. Therefore,
freedom might not only result from the act of obedience, but be implicit in the
act itself — the ultimate expression of freedom. Once a decision
(an election or other decision) through the democratic process has been made
(i.e., once the authority has been given to a government, a person, a committee
or an idea), then true liberty consists in submission or obedience to that
authority. Were it not so, submission
would cease to be a voluntary act.
Perhaps the highest expression of individual will is its surrender to
the greater will—the greater good—freely. In society,
sanctions exist for those who will not submit to the rule of law. As
stated in the beginning of this paper, it is impossible to define freedom outside
interdependence and hierarchy, since interdependence and hierarchy are always
circumscribing anyone who is "free" to act. What then does this
mean with respect to teachers, who live for the most part, within
non-democratic institutions? (As a rule, no public bureaucracies or
private corporations are purely democratic.)
When the locus of power is not distributed down towards the
grassroots, power remains in the hands of hierarchical authority. In other words, because power is a function
of authority, power is not distributed when authority is not distributed. However, power can still be legitimate even
when it is not distributed. Max Weber's
view of authority states that voluntary compliance to authority follows
[succeeds] the crucial granting of legitimacy to the person or group who
commands authority (Benne, 1970). Thus,
the power is legitimate along side legitimate authority.
However, since autonomy is associated with freedom, and
authority has been associated with power and control in a way that limits the
freedom of those who are in some way subject to it Weber contrasts authority
with power by defining power as a “capacity to unilaterally force others
to comply to one's own will."
(Power thus becomes illegitimate.)
This dichotomous contrast presents us with a contradiction because
Weber’s “unilateral” capacity within this contrast is inherently pejorative. We must consider that one’s will has, in a sense, already been given to legitimate
authority and consequently unviolated (not forced),
even when it causes a restriction of freedom.
That is to say if the power is [A] exercised by legitimate (and
ultimately benevolent) authority; and [B] subjects (dependents) have already
voluntarily submitted to the relationship, either directly or indirectly [51]
then the exercise of this power has the same legitimacy as its author—its
wielder—whether the subject likes it or not. Moreover, in the ultimate sense, the exercise
of such power is not unilateral. Power
is an attribute of authority, not something separate or dichotomous to be
contrasted with it. Subjects who have
entered the relationship voluntarily have no reason to complain, though
dialogue for change may be acceptable if there is venue and time.
It is legitimate to force someone to do something against
one’s immediate will without
this automatically being defined as an abuse of power since the first will already provided the
right. First will is like the “final cause” in science (Aristotle),
whereas immediate will can be
compared to “efficient cause.”
The latter creates the immediate effect, but the former set the design
in motion. This “final”
exercise of power is not only legitimate but hopefully for the greater good of
the community.
With the requirement of self-renewal built into the
legitimate design of authoritative institutions/offices—i.e., "...to
be criticized and adjudicated rationally" (Benne, p. 386), any pernicious
effects resulting from the exercise of authority would be self-corrected by the
system, ultimately. Thus, such a system need not be considered inherently
invidious. This recursive process of self-examination and reconstruction
is the answer to Hendel's (Benne, p. 390) request
that we examine authority's relationship to reason,
power, and coercion because here we see reason become the judge of
authority. Although power is an attribute of authority, it is always
subject to review (and potential correction) through proper design. With power as an attribute (or quality) of
authority rather than its definition, authority is not "reduced an
inequality of power" (Benne, p. 394). Moreover, in Benne’s new model, Carl Friedrich's concern (Benne,
p. 393) for the potential irrationality of power is eliminated, since
"rationality is always an ingredient of [legitimate]
authority"—by definition (Benne, p. 393). Power will necessarily be rational since it
will be a derivative of rational authority.
Legitimate power is always granted, never usurped.
Legitimate power becomes laudable and praiseworthy inside
the new definition of authority—that definition requiring service as an
attribute of authority. Indeed, it seems impossible to conceive of real
authority without power, and thus power becomes a mere attribute of authority,
no longer the concept to which it is assimilated [52]. Should injustice
pass uncorrected in the exercise of authority, however, then authority has not
merely been assimilated by power in concept, but in fact. The progenitor has become the servant of its
offspring.
It could be argued that voluntary compliance with (or
submission to) the school system is the legitimization of its authority
"over" the teacher, but without anthropogogical authority (as
defined above) the teacher may play no direct role in the definition of the
relationship, and may, in fact, feel compelled (for economic reasons) to take
the job [53]. Even if the creation of the system reflects the teacher's
participation within the broader democratic society, the granting of authority
and the decision making processes may be too remote to be considered directly
democratic. Moreover, neither ensure the teacher's autonomy. We
must therefore turn to the nature of the relationship itself to define the
nature and degree of autonomy — i.e., the freedom to act and to exercise
power.
The limits of power must be pre-defined and transparent in
relationships, so that expectations are the same and agreement can be
reached. The restructuring of authority
comes through explication and "demystification." This is just as true in families—between
children and their parents—as it is in schools, albeit a child will only
grasp this as he or she gets old enough to enter the dialogue with parents or
teachers. The limits of power must be
"visible" and "legible."
In the ruler/subject relationship, the subject is
responsible to scrutinize (in Lightfoot's words, "read the text") the
institutional structure, and thus move from "constraint" to
"connection." The relationship between teachers and
institutions for which they work, if explicit [54], becomes like a covenant
which outlines the responsibilities of both parties. An outline of
responsibilities ideally defines the fields within which each has the autonomy
to act. Those in authority provide facilities, structure, opportunities,
support and guidance. In return the recipient (teacher) agrees to follow
the guidance, take advantage of the structure and the facilities and accepts
the field of autonomy. If not explicit (and if "contrary"),
then what the teacher feels s/he may need to do to act autonomously may
actually subvert the authority of the bureaucracy within which s/he works.
In Mrs. Allen's case, this is exactly what happened when she
intentionally spilt coffee over the test scores because she was pressured to do
something (test students) she could not do in good conscience [55].
Moreover, she pays no attention to readiness scores in forming initial reading
groups because she knows her own personal ability is a better judge. She may be right, but this is anarchy and she
is outside the system.
It is the "personal qualities" (skills and creativity)
which are evident in more effective teachers who, thus, need to depend less on
supporting institutions for guidance. Moreover, because of their
abilities, they need to depend less on institutions to grant them legitimacy. Nonetheless, this reality begs the question:
“Whose decision is it, to give this teacher the power?” She has taken it for herself. Personal qualities is one of the two major
categories for granting legitimacy to an authority relation according to Weber
and is differentiated from positional authority by Spady. In this sense, her disobedience is
legitimized, but this is a recipe for disaster when entire systems are seeking
rules for order. Such continued
violations, based on arbitrary opinion can destroy the system.
If he had the chance, I feel that Carew
would concur with Mrs. Allen in assessing her own skills as outstanding enough
to give her authority [56] and the power she has taken unilaterally. But
the autonomy and independence she might have with a "redistribution of power"
[57] is reduced to loneliness [58] because she is made so powerless and
dependent. Her loneliness presents her with ethical dilemmas [59].
She would welcome [60] "community-based authority" [61] if the
community expressed values of commitment to equality of opportunity at home
[62] and school [63], which it does not. Thus, presently, her faith in an
anthropogogical approach to the hierarchy above her
might be pessimistically reduced to the fear of a "grab for power and
resources by middle-class whites" [64]. In her own relationship to
children "beneath" her, she would accept Benne's
move toward collegiality because she tries to "evaluate policy through
eyes of little children" [65] and to "meet the child's
personality" [66].
Likewise, we see Vivian Paley,
through what she describes as a gradually-increasing awareness, begin to meet
the child on the level of a learner and thereby "connect" and
"transfer" both autonomy and authority [67] to the child
(children). Apparently she is not restricted by the hierarchy above her,
and feels its support [68]. Above
all she knows she is in an interdependent relationship. She seeks to study and understand children at
the same time she is teaching them (both she and children are learners), while
children seek to guarantee their own autonomy by establishing rules [69] among
each other, and adopting those of the teacher [70]. The rules and
procedures become (for the children over time [71]) the locus of authority as Paley attempts to reduce her own positional authority role
[72]. "Rule authority" is the dominant model of authority for
Ms. Paley. The
reader senses that Paley believes her positional
authority should be only temporary in the socialization process of children,
and that rules and duties, as they become internalized, become part of
conscience, capable of mitigating anti-social behavior when no external
guidance or authority is present. This
is akin to an alter ego. When it is
time, adults should step aside, realizing of course that children need to know
adults are still available when needed.
At every level of development there are times to step aside, so children
can begin to feel their own autonomy and effectance.
Paley "makes connection" [73] with the
children more intimately by giving-in
to a new sets of rules [74] (thus giving up authority) established by the
child. Authority is thus distributed
downwards, or transferred to the new rules invented by the child, thus granting
a new level of autonomy [75] to the child — not only in fantasy but in
real-life. The children gained
autonomy in this real world by avoiding Ms. Paley's
positional authority altogether [76]; i.e., by creating fantasy worlds with
their own rules that Paley is careful not to violate
when she enters the play with them [77].
Paley is not divorced from this creative
process of inventing the rules, and indeed has input to the children’s
thinking process as they establish their rules—though giving as much
freedom as possible. In the fantasy
world of play children are free to experiment with rules that do not violate
the real world.
Sometimes these two sets of rules (fantasy and real [78]) get confused, or
conflict, as Benne would predict, [79] and she always attempts to solve the
dichotomy as he would [80]. Benne says:
"If the legitimacy of the two sets of rule
authorities can be acknowledged both by adults and adolescents, the situation
can be defined by both as one in which inventing a new set of more commonly
acceptable and authoritative rules.... [becomes] the goal of joint
effort." (Benne, p. 398.)
Vivian Paley’s total
philosophy, in sum, that "...we do need to find the logic by which private
fantasies are turned into social play, and the social play into a rule-governed
society of children and teachers," [81] I think, expresses the epitome of
her concept of autonomy in relationship or interdependence — the fruit of
a more reasonable and mature educational authority.
1. The consummation of human evolution is planetary
unity—an evolution that has had its earliest beginnings in the birth of
family life, its subsequent development in the achievement of tribal
solidarity, leading in turn to the constitution of the city-state, and
expanding later into the institution of independent and sovereign nations. I do not equate this evolution with what I
consider Benne’s unrealistic optimism that
"the world is moving forward in a progressive emancipation from the
necessity of any obedience to authority. [i.e.] ... freedom without
authority." (see Benne, p. 389.)
2. Lightfoot's Nov. 22nd lecture, Sociology
in Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1988.
3. Paley, p. 1 3. Fredrick 11 ... has his ways of
getting immediate responses...", knocking over, grabbing, stomping,
throwing, challenging positional authority.
4. e.g., Mollie is Three, p. 43.
5. William Sprady and Max Weber from Lightfoot's
Nov. 22nd lecture. Classic example is Christopher's recognition of it:
"No. Only the teacher says it." Paley, p.
22. The concept is defined in succeeding pages of the paper (page 5).
6. Benne, p. 396. Classic example in Paley:
[Mollie says,] "Yes, if you follow the rules. I know the rules, Dana, so
I'll tell you what they are if you want to be a star fairy."
"Okay," Dana responds softly. "I'll follow the rules." p.
144.
7. e.g., "We started with his thinking instead of my rule." Paley, p. 10. Also: "My games consistently miss the
point of their games ... I cannot convince the threes [three year olds] to
observe two important rules ... Suddenly I see the game through younger eyes
... " Paley, p. 69.
8. See bibliography: Benne, Kenneth,
"Authority in Education," Harvard Educational Review.
9. "The two three year olds know intuitively that once they begin to
pretend they become accountable to a community of pretenders." Paley, p. 4. and 11 . . . find out how children grow in
connectedness. . .” (p. 32). As an aspect of anthropogogical
authority, we see the dialogic of consultation change the norm or the rule:
“‘You're not next on the list, Erik,’ I say. ‘I have
to! I can't wait!’ ‘Okay. Go
ahead if no one minds’” (p. 52).
Update: Nakkula and Selman
(1991) have posited a definition of hermeneutics (derived from
Heidegger’s “Being and Time”) as “the understanding of
human being through ‘one’s connectedness to the world over
time.’” It concerns the
matters of interpreting one’s self within the web of interconnection to
other communicating beings in the world.
“Over time” implies a certain evolutionary perspective,
similar to the concept of a maturing
worldview. Whereas Gadamer emphasized the “literal impossibility of
fully understanding another’s truth because of idiosyncratic differences
in life history and personal experience,” Habermas
holds that we each have an “ethical responsibility to create
communicative contexts that allow us to explore personal and political
differences
10. Carew, p. 110 and 112. She is quite willing to "spill coffee
all over the test scores" to preserve her own autonomy although this is a
clear undermining and subversion of authority.
11. See bibliography.
12. See bibliography.
13. Benne, P. 391
14. Carew, Beyond Bias, p. 110. . . . she
cited several examples of bureaucratic insensitivity to children's needs."
15. Sennett, Richard, Authority, New
York: Knopf, 1980, as reflected in Lightfoot's Nov.
22nd lecture.
16. Ibid
17. Ibid
18. Dietrich Bonnhoffer (1965) in Freedom and Responsibility illustrates
this principle.
19. Benne, p. 397.
20. See "The Authority of Rules," Benne, p. 396.
21. Lightfoot, Nov. 22nd lecture
22. Lightfoot, Nov. 22nd lecture
23. Benne points out the possibility this way: ". . .new
bases of authority that were consonate with a person
centered and democratic way of life and a self renewing society [see Benne's quote of Whitehead, p. 387] and culture." p.
390.
24. See endnotes #5 and #72. Also see bottom of page 7.
25. See the "Authority of Expertise" relation described by Benne,
p. 394.
26. Benne, p. 392.
27. Not that a benevolent king could not exercise the same kind of
authority.
28. Benne, p. 392.
29. Benne, p. 399, quoting Eugene Rosenstock Huessy in "Youth and Authority" in American
Youth, ed. by Winslow and Davidson (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1940).
30. "There is nothing wrong with rules or specialized
expertise." Benne, p. 410.
31. Benne, p. 406.
32. Benne, p. 401.
33. Benne, p. 402.
34. "If the authority relation is successful, there is a movement
toward collegiality between teacher and student." Benne, p. 400.
35. Benne, p. 409.
36. Ibid
37. Benne, p. 408.
38. Benne, p. 400.
39. Benne, p. 405.
40. Benne, p. 405, 406. Also, Lightfoot, "Conflict is potentially
constructive as a way of clarifying and resolving differences in culture and
ideology between families and schools . . .” Worlds Apart, Sara Lawrence Lightfoot.
41. I present this in the Hegel tradition which, although a
form of idealism, Benne makes clear is not associated with "'idealistic'
attempts to bless and justify all established power relations by elevating them
to the status of authority relations." p. 394.
42. Benne, p. 401.
43. "The method of learning from conflict must be broadly
dialogic." Benne, p. 406. 11 ... reorientation to education as inherently
dialogic and not monologically transmissive."
p. 407
44. Worlds Apart, Sara Lawrence
Lightfoot.
45. Benne, p. 406.
46. Implying the opportunity as well.
47. From Lightfoot's Nov. 22nd lecture. See Richard Sennett's
Authority, New York: Knoft, 1980, wherein he suggests that the subject is
responsible to scrutinize ("read the text") the institutional
structure ... that subjects must (have the authority to) take responsibility
for judging the authority figure's actions.
48.
Without the explicit definition of the limits of power which Sennett (see endnote #17) suggests, both the rulers and the
subjects are likely to employ the illegitimate use of power.
the subversion can consist in the illegitimate use of power
by subjects as well as by the institutions or those in authority.
49. Unless one can conceive of authority without power.
50. Lightfoot's, Nov. 22nd lecture describes the damaging aspects of
authoritarianism at the "opposite end of the scale from
'democratic."'
51. Paley follows up her judgment with action (see
endnote #10 and text which refers to it).
52. Lightfoot's lecture pointed out the distortion of the concept of
authority when it is assimilated to the meaning of power.
53. Neither is there any guarantee that the teacher will participate, except
indirectly as a voter, in the scrutinization of the
use, or abuse, of power.
54. From Lightfoot's Nov. 22nd lecture. Also see Richard Sennett's
Authority, New York: Knoft, 1980.
55. See endnote #10.
56. “...extraordinary skill at interpersonal relationships and
interest in the individual needs of children." Carew,
p. 123.
57. Benne, p.406. See text which refers to endnote #31.
58. Lightfoot's Nov. 22nd lecture. Aloneness is reduced to loneliness.
59. She is a fervent advocate of children's rights and a strong supporter of
parents.... In child abuse situations, there is no supporting institution to
which she can turn. Carew, p. 115.
60. She believes the Inner School
should be "first and foremost a community school." p. 109.
61.See endnote #s 32 and 33.
62. She has to worry about socially disadvantaged kids having enough food,
clothing and general peace of mind freedom from abuse.
63. The facilities are in need of repair and the heating is inadequate.
64. Carew, p. 109. Because of her pessimism she
might prefer a benevolent king.
65. Carew, p. 110
66. Carew, p. 134
67.See my introduction, (second paragraph, page 2).
68.She is supported by the lab school at the University
of Chicago about which she makes no
remarks.
69. (See endnote #7 also.)
“my words ... carry little meaning." p. 6.
"She sees the rules and regulations ... not through my words but the
action of other children. "My lesson is a set of rules without tangible
evidence... p. 7.
“... inevitably conform to her rules." p. 8.
70. Seeking autonomy through the "authority of rules" in which
Benne says rules become the "bearer of authority" (Benne, p. 397).
"We tell the rules over and over until people remember." (Paley, p. 11)
“... I hear myself scolding, lecturing, continually sitting in judgment,
but this is exactly what the children want. Every complaint must be taken
seriously and dealt with instantly. The verdict is to be pronounced
unequivocally so the play can continue. The children do not seek that
punishment be inflicted, but they want their moments of indignation recognized
and upheld." (Paley, p. 83.)
71.See endnote #6.
72. We know she tries to avoid positional authority as much as possible by
such statements as 11 ... but I yield to the teacher's role." (Paley, p. 12.)
She never discards it entirely as evidenced by a
child's recognition of her position in, "No. Only the teacher says
it." (Paley, p. 22.) It is ready for emergencies
as well as teaching. (See last quote of previous endnote.)
73. Lightfoot's Nov. 22nd lecture.
74. “... conform to her rules." p. 8.
75. "It is clear to me that when I comment less on disruption and spend
more time helping children talk about the characters and the plot, the quality
of the play advances." (Paley, p. 17.)
"Children like me most when I am forgiving
misdeeds, theirs or someone else's... not too strangely I like myself best in
the same role." (Paley, p. 23.)
"Often I must disconnect myself from
the tableau." p. 77.
76."Children are passionately devoted to self determined goals. (Paley, p. 13.)
77. "...continually reorganize the classroom into fantasy worlds that
lie outside my jurisdiction." Paley, p. 14.
78. Paley depicts the rules of the fantasy giving
way to the rules of the real as the children grow older. See bottom of page 40.
Sometimes roles help resolve the confusion when roles cannot see bottom
of p. 11.
(For problems her children have in making the bridge between the two worlds,
see bottom of page 38 & 42, middle of page 58, top of page 64, middle of
65, top of 67, bottom of 87, and middle of page 134 for examples.)
79. “.. adults grant authority to one set of rules while adolescents
grant authority to another set..." p. 398.
80. "Learning is a reciprocal process. Molly is as much teacher
as student." (Paley, p. 32.) See endnote #9.
"The difference obviously lies in the questioner not the question."
p. 102.
"I must have misread the question... Do I understand the nature of the
fantasy, and, if I don't to what extent does the fantasy exist?" p. 103.
81. Paley, p. 17.
Benne, Kenneth, "Authority in Education," Harvard
Educational Review, August 1970, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 385-410
Benne was highly influenced by Dewy.
See, a review of Robert B. Westbrook's, John
Dewey and American Democracy. http://faculty.ed.uiuc.edu/wfeinber/Feinberg_Westbrook.html
From the review:
"Westbrook does a good job in advancing our understanding of Dewey as both
a political philosopher and a political agent. The book does not, however,
advance the project that motivated Dewey's political ideas--to develop a
conception of democracy that is appropriate to the modern era." Benne was working on this. Dewy
supported decentralized decision making structures and participatory decision.
Carew, Jean and Sara Lawrence
Lightfoot, Beyond Bias: Perspectives on Classrooms, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
University Press, 1979.
Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, New York, Continuum Publishing, 1970.
Illich, Ivan, Deschooling
Society, New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston, 1970.
Lightfoot, Sara Lawrence, Worlds Apart,
New York:
Balantine, 1988.
Paley, Vivian, Mollie is Three, Chicago,
Ill.: University
of Chicago Press, 1986.
Sennett, Richard, Authority, New York:
Knopf, 1980